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Price Reaction to Information  
with Heterogeneous Beliefs and Wealth Effects: 
Underreaction, Momentum, and Reversal †
By Marco Ottaviani and Peter Norman Sørensen *
This paper analyzes how asset prices in a binary market react to 
information when traders have heterogeneous prior beliefs. We show 
that the competitive equilibrium price underreacts to information 
when there is a bound to the amount of money traders are allowed 
to invest. Underreaction is more pronounced when prior beliefs are 
more heterogeneous. Even in the absence of exogenous bounds on the 
amount that traders can invest, prices underreact to information pro-
vided that traders become less risk averse as their wealth increases. 
In a dynamic setting, underreaction results in initial momentum and 
then reversal in the long run. (JEL D83, D84, G11, G12, G14)
This paper investigates how asset prices relate to the beliefs of traders in finan-
cial markets. Our analysis uncovers a novel theoretical mechanism through which 
prices initially underreact to information under the realistic assumption that traders 
have heterogeneous beliefs and are subject to wealth effects. This result provides a 
simple explanation of pricing patterns that are widely documented in asset markets. 
Underreaction to information is consistent with post-earning announcement drift 
and stock price momentum in the short run. In addition, the same mechanism that 
leads to initial underreaction and momentum also explains reversal in the long run.
We formulate our results in a trading model for a binary event. Traders can take 
positions in two Arrow-Debreu contingent assets, each paying $1 if the  corresponding 
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outcome occurs. Our underreaction result hinges on three characteristics of asset 
markets:
•	 Traders	have	heterogeneous	prior beliefs, given their limited experience with 
the underlying event contingent on which the asset pays.1 These initial opinions 
are subjective and thus are uncorrelated with the realization of the outcome.2 
Having different prior beliefs, traders gain from trading actively.
•	 Traders	have	access	to	public	information (such as an earnings announcement) 
about the eventual realization of the outcome on which the market is liquidated. 
Information has an objective nature because it is correlated with the outcome.3
•	 Traders	exhibit	wealth effects, which can take one of two forms. Initially, we 
develop the intuition for underreaction in a simple setting in which traders are 
risk neutral but are exogenously bounded by their limited wealth. We then turn 
to a more standard setting with risk-averse traders who endogenously limit their 
positions on the risky assets, and show that underreaction results when wealth-
ier traders are willing to take on more risk.
To sharpen our result, we assume that all traders interpret information in the same 
way, so that beliefs are concordant in Milgrom and Stokey’s (1982) terminology. The 
heterogeneity of traders’ posterior beliefs is thus uniquely due to the fixed amount of 
heterogeneity in their prior beliefs. How does the market price aggregate the traders’ 
posterior beliefs? How does the equilibrium price react to information that becomes 
publicly available to all traders? We address these questions through a comparative 
statics analysis of how the market price depends on changes in information.
Our main contribution is the observation that the market price systematically 
underreacts to information, rather than behaving like a posterior belief. Initially, we 
focus on the case in which each trader’s endowment is constant with respect to the 
outcome realization, so that trade is only motivated by differences in prior beliefs.
To understand the mechanism driving underreaction in a static setting, consider 
a hypothetical market based on which team, Italy or Denmark, will win a soccer 
game. Suppose that those traders who are subjectively more optimistic about Italy 
winning live further south. We begin in Section I by presenting the first incarnation 
of the result in a model with risk-neutral traders and bounded wealth. In equilibrium, 
traders living south of a certain threshold latitude invest all their wealth in the asset 
that pays if Italy wins; likewise, traders north of the threshold latitude invest all their 
wealth in the Denmark asset (Proposition 1).
Now, what happens when traders observe information (such as a player injury) 
more in favor of Italy winning? This information causes the price of the Italy asset 
to be higher, while contemporaneously reducing the price of the Denmark asset, 
1 We thus depart from the common prior assumption associated to the so-called Harsanyi doctrine. We refer to 
Morris (1995b) for a discussion of the assumption of heterogeneous priors. See also Blume and Easley’s (1998) 
survey of rational learning for well-behaved examples where there is no convergence to common beliefs.
2 For the purpose of our analysis, traders’ subjective prior beliefs play the role of exogenous parameters, akin 
to the role played by preferences. As in most work on heterogeneous priors, prior beliefs are given exogenously 
in our model. We refer to Brunnermeier and Parker (2005) for a model in which heterogeneous prior beliefs arise 
endogenously.
3 This conceptual distinction between prior beliefs and information is standard—as Aumann (1976) notes, “rec-
onciling subjective probabilities makes sense if it is a question of implicitly exchanging information, but not if we 
are talking about ‘innate’ differences in priors.”
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compared to the case with less favorable information. As a result, the southern trad-
ers (who are optimistic about Italy) are able to buy fewer Italy assets, which are 
now more expensive.4 Similarly, the northern traders can afford, and thus demand, 
more Denmark assets, now cheaper. Hence, the market would have an excess sup-
ply of the Italy asset and excess demand for the Denmark asset. For the market to 
equilibrate, some northern traders must turn to the Italian side. In summary, when 
information more favorable to an outcome is available, the marginal trader who 
determines the price has a prior belief that is less favorable to that outcome. Through 
this countervailing adjustment, the heterogeneity in priors dampens the effect of 
information on the price.
This underreaction result (Proposition 2) amends the common interpretation that 
the price of an Arrow-Debreu asset represents the belief held by the market about the 
probability of the event. The reason why the price does not behave like a posterior 
belief is that there is no constant market prior belief for which the equilibrium price 
is the Bayesian posterior update that incorporates the available information. Instead, 
the marginal trader’s prior changes in the direction opposite to information, and the 
more so the more heterogeneous beliefs are (Proposition 3). Underreaction is con-
sistent with evidence from asset markets, as well as with the widespread observation 
of the favorite-longshot bias in betting and prediction markets, whereby prices of 
favorites underestimate the corresponding empirical probabilities, while prices of 
longshots overestimate them (Section IB and Corollary 1).5
For the second step of our analysis, in Section II we turn to a more traditional asset 
market model with risk-averse traders. We initially focus on the special case with 
homogeneous endowments across events. After characterizing the unique equilib-
rium in Proposition 4, Proposition 5 verifies that equilibrium prices react  one-for-one 
to information, like posterior beliefs, if traders have constant absolute risk aversion 
(CARA) preferences. Proposition 6 establishes that underreaction holds under the 
empirically plausible assumption that traders have decreasing absolute risk aversion 
(DARA), even when no exogenous bound is imposed on the traders’ wealth. The 
logic is the same as in our baseline model. When favorable information is revealed, 
traders who take long positions on the asset that now becomes more expensive suffer 
a negative wealth effect. Hence these traders become more risk averse and cut back 
their positions.
Our analysis combines elements of the average investor view with the marginal 
investor view à la Ali (1977) and Miller (1977), a view with a lineage that Mayshar 
(1983) traces back to John Maynard Keynes, John Burr Williams, and James Tobin. 
The average investor view prevails in the absence of wealth effect, given that het-
erogeneous beliefs can be aggregated under CARA, as shown by Wilson (1968) and 
Lintner (1969).6 The marginal investor view prevails when heterogeneous beliefs 
are combined with wealth effects. Under DARA, we show that wealth effects not 
4 This wealth effect is the equivalent loss in income suffered by an individual when a change in prices implies 
that the desired trade becomes more expensive.
5 In addition, our testable prediction that underreaction is more pronounced when trader beliefs are more hetero-
geneous seems to be borne out by the data; see Section IC.
6 The case with CARA preferences and heterogeneous priors is also analyzed by Varian (1989) in a generaliza-
tion of Grossman (1976). (In their models, the price is also a vehicle through which information becomes public 
to all traders.)
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only inhibit aggregation, but systematically generate underreaction to information 
because the price assigns an increased weight to traders with beliefs that are con-
trary to the realized information.
Heterogeneity in beliefs is essential to obtain underreaction and cannot merely be 
replaced by heterogeneity in endowments across traders. When beliefs are common, 
heterogeneity in endowments permits demand aggregation for a class of prefer-
ences with wealth effects, hyperbolic absolute risk aversion (HARA) with com-
mon cautiousness parameter (Gorman 1953; and Rubinstein 1974). In this case, 
more extreme information induces all traders, buyers as well as sellers, to take more 
extreme positions; under the HARA condition positions adjust in a balanced way, 
and the price reacts to information as a Bayesian posterior belief. However, this 
knife-edge result is again upset in the direction of underreaction in the more gen-
eral (and relevant) case which combines heterogeneous priors with heterogeneous 
endowments. Proposition 7 establishes that underreaction holds if traders exhibit 
DARA as well as HARA with common positive cautiousness parameter, and if 
subjective prior beliefs are independent of individual endowment and preference 
parameters.7
For our third step, in Section III we turn to the correlation pattern of price changes 
over time in a dynamic extension of the model with new information arriving each 
period, as in Milgrom and Stokey (1982). After characterizing the equilibrium 
(Proposition 8), we find that underreaction entails two dynamic price patterns when 
our setting is ex ante symmetric with respect to the two events:8
•	 The	 first-round	 underreaction	 is	 immediately	 followed	 by	 price	 momentum	
(Proposition 9). Intuitively, the arrival of additional information over time partly 
undoes the initial underreaction. This first result is consistent with the observa-
tion of momentum—a long-standing puzzle documented by a large empirical 
literature in finance (for example see Jegadeesh and Titman 1993; Bernard and 
Thomas 1989; and Moskowitz, Ooi, and Pedersen 2012).
•	 The	initial	underreaction	implies	a	subsequent	reversal	(Proposition 10), given 
that the marginal trader has contrarian beliefs. Thus, long-term price changes are 
negatively correlated with medium-horizon price changes. This reversal is also 
consistent with empirical evidence (see DeBondt and Thaler 1985; Fama and 
French 1992; Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny 1994; and Asness, Moskowitz, 
and Pedersen 2013).
Like Milgrom and Stokey (1982), our model allows traders to have arbitrary risk 
preferences, heterogeneous endowments, heterogeneous priors, and concordant 
information. To their well-known characterization of equilibrium, we add a com-
parative statics analysis of the first-round equilibrium price with respect to informa-
tion as well as a characterization of the correlation of price changes over time. Our 
restriction to two events makes the analysis particularly tractable; we return to this 
point in Section IV.
7 On the optimal allocation of risk with heterogeneous prior beliefs and risk preferences, see also Gollier (2007) 
and references therein. To this literature we add the consideration of how information affects belief aggregation.
8 Symmetry is a sufficient but not necessary assumption for our model to be consistent with underreaction and 
reversal.
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While we maintain that all traders are rational and symmetrically informed, an 
alternative approach in the theoretical literature emphasizes the role (and pattern) of 
noise trading for obtaining deviations of market prices from fundamental values. To 
the extent that noise trade cannot be distinguished from informed trade, overreaction 
arises when risk-averse traders require a risk premium for absorbing noise trade.9 
In Serrano-Padial (2012), rational traders constrained by an auction mechanism can 
be unwilling to correct mispricing induced by naïve traders, if overpricing occurs 
at lower values and underpricing at higher values. In a dynamic setting, Cespa and 
Vives (2012) obtain underreaction or overreaction depending on the opaqueness 
surrounding liquidation value and the predictability of noise traders. Instead, our 
pricing patterns are not driven by the exogenous process governing the dynamic 
arrival of noise traders.
Another strand of the literature allows traders to interpret the information incor-
rectly or differently, thus relaxing concordant beliefs. For example, Harris and Raviv 
(1993) assume that traders with common prior update beliefs to different extents in 
response to information, and obtain underreaction to information which contradicts 
earlier information. Barberis, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998) derive momentum by 
assuming that traders are mistaken about the correct information model, while Hong 
and Stein (1999) posit that information diffuses gradually and is initially understood 
only by some traders. Allen, Morris, and Shin (2006) consider short-lived traders 
with private information who forecast the next period average forecasts and so end 
up overweighting the common public information. Banerjee, Kaniel, and Kremer 
(2009) obtain momentum by assuming that traders do not recognize the information 
of other traders and thus do not react to the information contained in the equilibrium 
price.10 In contrast, we obtain both short-term momentum and long-term reversal, 
even when all long-lived traders agree about the correct interpretation of informa-
tion. Our results are driven by differential wealth effects across traders with different 
beliefs, an aspect that the previous literature seems to have disregarded.11
We collect the proofs of the main results in the Appendix. The relatively standard 
proof of Proposition 8 is in the online Appendix.
I. Bounded Wealth Model
Events.—Traders take positions on whether or not a binary event, A, is realized 
(e.g., the Democratic candidate wins the 2016 presidential election). There are two 
Arrow-Debreu assets corresponding to the two possible realizations: one asset pays 
9 Intuitively, a lower price in a noisy REE (rational expectations equilibrium) suggests the realization of lower 
demand by noise traders (or greater aggregate supply). Rational risk-averse traders can only be willing to take a 
larger position (which is necessary for the market to clear when the aggregate supply is high) if they expect the price 
to increase on average in the future—hence, the price must overreact to information in this noisy REE setting. See 
Vives (2008, p. 121) for an analytical explanation along these lines.
10 While we consider the arrival of information, Banerjee, Kaniel, and Kremer (2009) assume that dynamic price 
changes are driven by noise. They find that momentum is impossible with commonly known heterogeneous prior 
beliefs.
11 A complementary approach in the literature seeks to explain asset-pricing anomalies through agency problems 
in delegated portfolio management (see Shleifer and Vishny 1997; and Vayanos and Woolley 2013).
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out one unit of cash if event A is realized and zero otherwise, while the other asset 
pays out one cash unit if the complementary event  A c is realized and zero otherwise.12
Wealth.—We assume that there is a continuum I of competitive, risk-neutral trad-
ers.13 Trader wealth in this market is bounded, as each trader i initially holds a given 
safe endowment, the amount  w i 0 of each asset. Traders exchange their assets with 
other traders in a competitive market. Traders are not allowed to hold a negative 
quantity of either asset. Thus, there is an endogenous upper bound on the number of 
asset units that each individual trader can purchase and eventually hold. Risk-neutral 
traders would gain from relaxing this exogenous bound.
Priors.—Initially, trader i has subjective prior belief  q i . For convenience, we 
normalize the aggregate endowment of each asset to 1. The initial distribution of 
assets over individuals is described by the cumulative distribution function G. Thus 
G ( q ) ∈  [ 0, 1 ] denotes the share of all assets initially held by individuals with sub-
jective prior belief less than or equal to q. We assume that G is continuous, and that 
G is strictly increasing on the interval where G ∉  { 0, 1 } .14
Information.—Before trading, all traders observe the realization of a public signal 
with likelihood ratio L ∈  ( 0, ∞ ) for event A. By Bayes’ rule the subjective posterior 
belief  π i satisfies
(1)    π i  _ 
1 −  π i  =  
 q i  _ 
1 −  q i  L.
Posterior beliefs are concordant, as Bayes’ rule uses the same L for every trader i. 
This setting amounts to assuming that the arrival of the public signal triggers the 
simultaneous dispersion of prior beliefs, and that this dispersion is stochastically 
independent of the realization of the public signal.15
Equilibrium.—Competitive traders take asset prices as given. We normalize the 
sum of the two asset prices to 1, and focus on the price p of the asset paying in 
event A. Trader i chooses a feasible asset position  ( w i  ( A ) ,  w i   ( A c ) ) to maximize 
subjective expected value  π i  w i  ( A ) +  ( 1 −  π i )  w i  ( A c ) . With Arrow-Debreu assets, 
 w i  ( A ) ,  w i  ( A c ) also denote the event-dependent cash payout. Markets clear when the 
aggregate demand for each asset precisely equals the aggregate endowment.16
12 Traders cannot affect the exogenously given event outcome. For an analysis of traders’ incentives to manipu-
late the outcome see Ottaviani and Sørensen (2007), who disregard the wealth effect. Lieli and Nieto-Barthaburu 
(2009) extend the analysis to allow for the possibility of feedback, whereby a decision maker acts on the basis of 
the information revealed by the market.
13 The results derived in this section immediately extend to the case of risk-loving traders, whose behavior is also 
to adopt an extreme asset position. We turn to risk-averse traders in Section II.
14 The assumption that the priors are continuously distributed is made to simplify the analysis, but is not essential 
for our underreaction result.
15 Formally, let ω denote the payoff-relevant state and s a payoff-irrelevant signal. The subjective belief 
of individual i assigns joint density  f i  ( s, ω ) = f  ( s | ω )  q i  ( ω ) . With binary ω ∈  { A,  A c } , we have let L ( s ) = f  ( s | A ) /f  ( s |  A c ) .
16 Note that the informational requirements for competitive equilibrium are very weak; e.g., see Morris (1995a). 
Submitting the individual demand in response to a price is a dominant strategy for each trader and does not require 
any knowledge about other traders.
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A. Competitive Equilibrium
Solving the competitive demand problem of the risk-neutral traders is straightfor-
ward. Let the public information be realized with likelihood ratio L, and consider 
trader i with posterior belief  π i resulting via (1). Given market price p, the subjec-
tive expected return on the asset that pays out in event A is  π i − p, while the other 
asset’s expected return is  ( 1 −  π i ) −  ( 1 − p ) = p −  π i . With the given bound on 
trades, risk-neutral demand thus satisfies the following: if  π i > p, trader i exchanges 
the entire endowment of the  A c asset into  ( 1 − p )  w i 0 /p units of the A asset. The 
final portfolio is then  ( w i  ( A ) ,  w i  ( A c ) ) =  ( w i 0 /p, 0 ) . Conversely, when  π i < p, the 
trader’s final portfolio is  ( w i  ( A ) ,  w i  ( A c ) ) =  ( 0,  w i 0 / ( 1 − p ) ) . Finally, when  π i = p, 
the trader is indifferent over all feasible trades.
Aggregate demand for the A asset is then given by 1/p times the cumulated wealth 
of traders with posterior belief above p. Markets clear when this equals the aggre-
gate endowment, 1.
PROPOSITION 1: The competitive equilibrium price, p, is the unique solution to 
the equation
(2)  p = 1 − G  ( p _  ( 1 − p ) L + p ) 
 and is a strictly increasing function of the information realization L.
B. Underreaction to Information
Inverting Bayes’ rule (1) after public information realization L, we can always 
interpret the price p as the posterior belief of a hypothetical individual with ini-
tial belief p/ [  ( 1 − p ) L + p ] . According to (2), this hypothetical individual is the 
marginal trader, and this initial belief might be interpreted as an aggregate of the 
heterogeneous subjective prior beliefs of the individual traders. However, this way 
of aggregating subjective priors cannot be separated from the realization of infor-
mation. Our main result states that this initial belief of the marginal trader moves 
systematically against the public information available to traders.
This systematic change in the market prior against the information implies that 
the market price underreacts to information. Consider the inference of any outside 
observer with a fixed prior belief q. The observer’s posterior probability, π ( L ) , for 
the event A satisfies (1), or
(3)  log  π ( L )  _ 
1 − π ( L )  = log  
q
 _ 
1 − q + log L.
The expression on the left-hand side is the posterior log-likelihood ratio for 
event A, which clearly moves one-to-one with changes in log L. Part (ii) of the fol-
lowing Proposition notes that the corresponding expression for the market price, 
log  ( p  ( L ) / ( 1 − p ( L ) ) ) does not possess this property, but rather moves less than 
one-for-one with the publicly observable log L.
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PROPOSITION 2: Suppose that beliefs are truly heterogeneous, i.e., the distribu-
tion G is nondegenerate. (i) The marginal trader moves opposite to the information, 
i.e., the implied ex ante market belief p/ [  ( 1 − p ) L + p ] is strictly decreasing in L. 
(ii) The market price underreacts to initial information: for any pair  L′ > L we have
(4)  log  L′ − log L > log  p ( L′ )  _ 
1 − p ( L′ )  − log  
p ( L ) 
 _ 
1 − p ( L )  > 0.
To understand the intuition for part (i), consider what happens when public infor-
mation is more favorable to event A (corresponding, say, to the Democratic candidate 
winning the election over the Republican candidate). Naturally, by (2) the price p 
for asset A is higher when L is higher. The trading bound forces optimists (with high 
prior  q i ) to purchase fewer units of asset A: the amount of A assets which can be 
obtained through selling all the  A c endowment is  ( 1 − p )  w i 0 /p, decreasing in p. If 
the marginal trader were unchanged at the higher price that results with higher L, 
there would be insufficient demand for the A assets sold out by pessimists. To bal-
ance the market it is necessary that some traders who were buying the Republican 
asset before now change sides and put their money on the Democratic candidate. In 
the new equilibrium, the price must thus move traders from the pessimistic to the 
optimistic side. Hence, although the price, p, rises with the information, L, it rises 
more slowly than a posterior belief, because of this negative effect on the prior belief 
of the marginal trader.
The underreaction result hinges on the fact that the endogenous upper bound 
(equal to  w i 0 /p) on the individual position in asset A is inversely related to its price.17
Application to Prediction Markets.—Our assumptions of bounded wealth at risk 
and equal endowments across event realizations are particularly descriptive in the 
context of prediction markets. Prediction markets are trading mechanisms that tar-
get unique events, such as the outcome of a presidential election or the identity of 
the winner in a sport contest.18 Because the realized outcomes are observed, these 
simple markets are useful laboratories for testing asset pricing theories.
According to an institutional feature of prediction markets, individuals are 
typically allowed to allocate a bounded budget to the market, as in our model.19 
According to the following corollary of Proposition 2, underreaction implies that 
π ( L ) > p ( L ) when p ( L ) is high (so that event A is a favorite) and π ( L ) < p ( L ) 
when p ( L ) is low (longshot).
17 Underreaction would not appear if instead there were a price-independent cap on the number of assets that 
each trader can buy. Then a constant set of optimists (or pessimists) would buy the full allowance of the A (or  A c ) 
asset. The marginal trader would then be constant and there would be no underreaction.
18 Partly thanks to their track record as forecasting tools—as documented, for instance, by Forsythe et al. (1992) 
and Berg et al. (2008)—prediction markets have attracted some recent interest as mechanisms to collect information 
and improving decision making in business and public policy contexts. See Hanson (1999); Wolfers and Zitzewitz 
(2004); and Hahn and Tetlock (2005).
19 For example, in the Iowa Electronic Markets each trader cannot invest more than $500. Exemption from 
 anti-gambling legislation is granted for such small stakes given the educational purpose of these markets. Naturally, 
traders have no endowment risk and are given an equal number of the two assets when they enter the market.
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COROLLARY 1: The market price exhibits a favorite-longshot bias, as there exists 
a price  p ∗ ∈  [ 0, 1 ] such that p ( L ) >  p ∗ implies π ( L ) > p ( L ) , and p ( L ) <  p ∗ implies 
π ( L ) < p ( L ) .
Thus, the favorite-longshot bias results, with longshot outcomes occurring less 
often than indicated by the price, while the opposite is true for favorites. The favor-
ite-longshot bias is widely documented in the empirical literature on betting and 
prediction markets when comparing winning frequencies with market prices (see 
Thaler and Ziemba 1988; Jullien and Salanié 2008; and Snowberg and Wolfers 
2010).
Rearranging (4) with (3), we have that log  ( π/ ( 1 − π ) ) − log  ( p/ ( 1 − p ) ) is a 
strictly increasing function of p. Thus, when running the following regression
(5)  log   π j  _ 
1 −  π j  = a + b log  
 p j 
 _ 
1 −  p j  +  ε j , 
Proposition 2 predicts that b > 1. Once we identify the posterior  π j chance for an 
event with the empirical winning frequency corresponding to market price  p j , our 
model thus offers a new informational explanation of the favorite-longshot bias. 
Outcomes favored by the market occur more often than if the price is interpreted as a 
probability—and, conversely, longshots win less frequently than the price indicates.
Before proceeding, it is worth pausing to discuss the relation with the alternative 
explanation for the favorite-longshot proposed by Ali (1977) in a pioneering paper 
and recently revived by Manski (2006); Gjerstad (2005); and Wolfers and Zitzewitz 
(2005) in the fledgling literature on prediction markets. In a model of equilibrium 
betting with heterogeneous prior beliefs, Ali (1977) notes that if the median bettor 
thinks that one outcome (defined to be the favorite) is more likely than the other, 
then the equilibrium fraction of parimutuel bets on this favorite outcome is lower 
than the belief of the median bettor. Ali (1977, Theorem 2) explains the bias by 
making the auxiliary assumption that the median (or average) belief corresponds to 
the empirical probability. But this assumption is contentious. If the traders’ beliefs 
really have information content, their positions should depend on the information 
about these beliefs that is contained in the market price. This tension underlies the 
modern information economics critique of the Walrasian approach to price forma-
tion with heterogeneous beliefs (see the discussion in chapter 1 of Grossman 1989). 
To the prediction markets literature, we contribute the observation that the favor-
ite-longshot bias results without making any assumption on how the beliefs of the 
median member of the population relate to the empirical probability. Even if we 
remain agnostic about the relation between (the distribution of prior) beliefs and the 
empirical chance of the outcome, we show that underreaction results as a compara-
tive statics result with respect to information.20
20 Ottaviani and Sørensen (2009, 2010) offer a different explanation for the favorite-longshot bias in the context 
of a game-theoretic model of parimutuel betting where traders have a common prior but are unable to condition 
their behavior on the information that is contained in the equilibrium price.
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C. Comparative Statics in Prior Beliefs and Wealth
Our equilibrium price p ( L ) is determined by (2) which depends on the primitive 
distribution G of wealth across traders with different prior beliefs. Changes in this 
wealth distribution can affect the equilibrium and hence the extent of underreaction. 
We show that underreaction is more pronounced if this distribution is wider. Note 
that a wider distribution arises in a population where traders simply have greater 
belief heterogeneity. A wider distribution of wealth over beliefs also arises when 
more opinionated traders attract more resources, or when less opinionated traders 
stay away from the market.
In analogy with Rothschild and Stiglitz’s (1970) definition of mean-preserving 
spread, define distribution  G′ to be a median-preserving spread of distribution G 
if G and  G′ have the same median m and satisfy  G′ ( q ) ≥ G ( q ) for all q ≤ m and 
 G′ ( q ) ≤ G ( q ) for all q ≥ m.
PROPOSITION 3: Suppose that  G′ is a median-preserving spread of G, denoting 
the common median by m. Then, more underreaction results under  G′ than under 
G: L >   ( 1 − m ) /m implies π ( L )  >  p ( L )  >   p′ ( L )  >  1/2, and L <   ( 1 − m ) /m 
implies π ( L ) < p ( L ) <  p′ ( L ) < 1/2.
This result is consistent with the observation of more pronounced  favorite-longshot 
bias in political prediction markets, which are naturally characterized by a wider 
dispersion of beliefs; see Page and Clemen (2013) for corroborating evidence. Our 
baseline model with bounded wealth is also applicable to financial markets where 
traders typically have a finite wealth and/or can borrow a finite amount of money 
due to imperfections in the credit market. Empirical evidence by Verardo (2009) 
confirms that momentum profits are significantly larger for portfolios characterized 
by higher heterogeneity of beliefs.
Example.—For illustration, suppose that the distribution of subjective prior beliefs 
over the interval  [ 0, 1 ] is G ( q ) =  q γ / [  q γ +  ( 1 − q ) γ ] , where γ > 0 is a parameter 
that measures the concentration of beliefs. The greater γ is, the less spread is this 
symmetric belief distribution around the average belief q = 1/2. For γ = 1 beliefs 
are uniformly distributed, as γ → ∞ beliefs become concentrated near 1/2, and as 
γ → 0 beliefs are maximally dispersed around the extremes of  [ 0, 1 ] . The equilib-
rium market price p ( L ) satisfies the linear relation
  log  p ( L )  _ 
1 − p ( L )  =  
γ _ 
1 + γ log L.
Hence, γ/ ( 1 + γ ) ∈  ( 0, 1 ) measures the extent to which the price reacts to informa-
tion. Price underreaction is minimal when γ is very large, corresponding to the case 
with nearly homogeneous beliefs. Conversely, there is an arbitrarily large degree of 
underreaction when beliefs are maximally heterogeneous, corresponding to γ close 
to zero.
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Assume that a market observer’s prior is q = 1/2 for event A, consistent with a 
symmetric market price of p ( L = 1 ) = 1/2 in the absence of additional information. 
The posterior belief associated with price p then satisfies
  log  π ( L )  _ 
1 − π ( L )  = log L =  
1 + γ _γ  log  
p ( L ) 
 _ 
1 − p ( L )  .
This provides a particularly strong foundation for the linear regression (5). As illus-
trated in Figure 1 for the case with uniform beliefs (γ = 1), the market price over-
states the winning chance of a longshot and understates the winning chance of a 
favorite by a factor of two.
II. Risk Aversion Model
So far we have assumed that each individual trader is risk neutral, and thus ends 
up taking as extreme a position as possible on either side of the market. Now, we 
show that our main result extends nicely to risk-averse traders, under the empirically 
plausible assumption that their absolute risk aversion is decreasing with wealth. 
This result does not rely on imposing exogenous constraints on trades.
Figure 1
Notes: This plot shows the posterior probability for event A as a function of the market price 
p for the A asset, when the prior beliefs of the risk-neutral traders are uniformly distributed 
(γ = 1 in the example). The market price is represented by the diagonal.
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A. Homogeneous Endowments
We first retain the assumption that traders are initially endowed with the same 
number of each asset,  w i 0 ( A ) =  w i 0 ( A c ) =  w i 0 . Public information L and the wealth 
distribution G are as in the baseline model.
The first difference to the former model is that trader i now maximizes subjective 
expected utility,  π i  u i  ( w i ( A ) ) +  ( 1 −  π i )  u i  ( w i ( A c ) ) , where the utility function  u i is 
twice differentiable with  u i ′ > 0 and  u i ′′ < 0. We assume that  u i satisfies the DARA 
assumption that the de Finetti-Arrow-Pratt coefficient of absolute risk aversion, 
− u i ′′ / u i ′, is weakly decreasing in its argument  w i .
The second change is that we allow traders to adopt negative positions in the 
assets. There is no longer any exogenous bound on portfolios—traders can exchange 
as many units as they like of one asset into the other. Risk aversion implies that they 
prefer not to go to extremes.
The combination of DARA with homogeneous endowments implies that aggre-
gate demand is well behaved, in analogy with Proposition 1:
PROPOSITION 4: There exists a unique competitive equilibrium. The price, p, is a 
strictly increasing function of the information realization L.
Belief Aggregation with CARA Preferences.—Our contention is that underreac-
tion results once we relax simultaneously two assumptions that are commonly made 
in asset pricing models with information: no wealth effects and common prior. With 
heterogeneous priors but without wealth effects there is no underreaction. To see 
this, suppose here that all traders have constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) 
utility functions, with possibly heterogeneous degrees of risk aversion, such that 
 u i ( w ) = −exp ( −w/ t i ) , where  t i > 0 is constant. Denoting the relative risk tolerance 
of trader i in the population by  τ i =  t i / ∫ 0 1  t j dG  ( q j ) , we have:
PROPOSITION 5: Suppose traders have CARA preferences and heterogeneous 
beliefs. If we define an average prior belief q by
(6)  log  q _ 
1 − q =  ∫ 0 1  τ i log   q i  _ 1 −  q i  dG  ( q i ) , 
then the equilibrium price satisfies Bayes’ rule with market prior q.
Under CARA, wealth effects vanish and heterogeneous beliefs can be aggre-
gated, according to formula (6), consistent with the classic result of Wilson (1968); 
Lintner (1969); and Rubinstein (1974). A similar result has also been obtained 
by Varian (1989). The market price thus behaves as a posterior belief and there is 
no underreaction.
Underreaction with DARA Preferences.—We have seen that CARA preferences 
lead to an unbiased price reaction to information in equilibrium. Now we verify 
that, for strict DARA preferences, a bias arises in the price. When L rises, the rising 
equilibrium price yields a negative wealth effect on any optimistic individual (with 
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π i > p) who is a net demander ( w i  ( A ) >  w i  ( A c ) ). Conversely, pessimistic traders 
benefit from the price increase. With DARA preferences, the wealth effect implies 
that optimists become more risk averse while pessimists become less risk averse. 
Although the price rises with L, it is less reactive than a posterior belief, because 
pessimists trade more heavily in the market when information is more favorable.21
PROPOSITION 6: Suppose that beliefs are truly heterogeneous and that all indi-
viduals have strict DARA preferences. The market price underreacts to information, 
satisfying (4) for any pair,  L′ > L.
The asset pricing literature often assumes that traders have a common prior belief 
(Grossman 1976). Under the common prior assumption, the price reacts  one-for-one 
to information, regardless of risk attitudes. Our underreaction result thus holds once 
we allow for both heterogeneous priors and wealth effects. The intuition for this 
result is the same as in the baseline model with limited wealth. As L increases, opti-
mists suffer a negative wealth effect, become more risk averse, and thus optimally 
reduce their demand of the A assets. The converse holds for pessimists. Thus, the 
equilibrium price adjusts by increasing the weight assigned to traders with prior 
beliefs less favorable to A.
Traders constrained by risk aversion choose an asset bundle that satisfies a famil-
iar first-order condition for optimality,
(7)    π i  _ 
1 −  π i   
 u i ′  ( w i  ( A ) ) 
 _ u i ′   ( w i  ( A c ) )   =  
p
 _ 
1 − p .
According to this consumption-based asset pricing relation, the price is proportional 
to the subjective expected marginal utility of payoffs. Since subjective beliefs are 
updated according to Bayes’ rule, our price underreaction result can be alternatively 
interpreted as a systematic change in marginal utilities with DARA preferences. Our 
proposition proves that due to the wealth effect, as L rises,  u i ′  ( w i  ( A ) ) / u i ′  ( w i  ( A c ) ) 
falls for all traders.
Example with Logarithmic Preferences.—Suppose traders have logarithmic 
preferences,  u i  ( w ) = log w, satisfying DARA. In order to highlight the difference 
between Propositions 2 and 6, namely the inclusion of unconstrained traders, we 
remove completely the trading constraint. The well-known solution to this indi-
vidual demand problem with Cobb-Douglas preferences gives  w i  ( A ) =  π i  ( w i 0 ) /p. 
The market-clearing price is then a wealth-weighted average of the posterior beliefs,22
(8)  p  ( L ) =  ∫ 
0
 1 π  ( L ) dG  ( q ) =  ∫ 
0
 1  qL _ 
qL +  ( 1 − q )  dG  ( q ) .
21 Given that CARA is the knife-edge case, by reversing the logic of Proposition 6 it can be shown that overreac-
tion results when risk aversion is increasing but not too much (so that demand monotonicity is preserved).
22 Cobb-Douglas preferences are homothetic, so that wealth expansion paths are linear. With more general utility 
functions, this property fails, and the extent of underreaction can be affected by a proportional resizing of wealth 
across the population of traders.
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When G is uniform, integration by parts of (8) yields p ( L ) 
= L ( L − 1 − log L ) / ( L − 1 ) 2 for all L ≠ 1. If p ( 1 ) =  ∫ 0 1 q dq = 1/2 is the prior 
belief of an outside observer, the favorite-longshot bias can be illustrated in a 
graph similar to Figure 1.
B. Heterogeneous Endowments
We now allow trader i ’s initial asset endowment to vary across events, 
 w i 0 ( A ) ≠  w i 0 ( A c ) , as is natural in financial markets.23 In order to derive results in 
this more general case, we restrict the class of individual preferences. Suppose that 
there exist constants  α i and β such that trader i has hyperbolic absolute risk aversion (HARA), − u i ′′ ( w ) / u i ′( w ) = 1/ ( α i + β w ) . The fact that β is constant across traders 
means that traders are equally cautious.24 We will focus attention on the case where 
cautiousness satisfies the DARA assumption that β > 0.
The individual characteristics—namely the endowment vector  w i 0 , the prefer-
ence parameter  α i , and the prior  q i —are jointly distributed on   4 with probability 
measure H. We assume that the aggregate endowments  w 0 ( A ) =  ∫    w i 0 ( A ) dH and 
w 0 ( A c ) =  ∫    w i 0 ( A c ) dH as well as the average preference parameter α =  ∫    α i dH 
are well-defined finite numbers. We likewise assume that  ∫    ( q i / ( 1 −  q i ) ) β dH and ∫    ( ( 1 −  q i ) / q i ) β dH are both finite—this technical condition helps in our proofs, 
and is satisfied when individual prior beliefs near the extremes 0 and 1 are not too 
common. We finally assume that  ( w i 0 ( A ) ,  w i 0 ( A c ) ,  α i 0 ) are stochastically indepen-
dent of  q i .
In the special case of common prior belief q, the HARA assumption guarantees 
that there exists a representative trader; see Rubinstein (1974). This means that the 
aggregate demand is invariant to redistribution of the initial endowment and can be 
expressed as the individual demand function derived from the representative trader’s 
utility function. In equilibrium, this representative trader must demand the constant 
aggregate endowment  ( w 0 ( A ) ,  w 0 ( A c ) ) , and the equilibrium price p ( L ) must satisfy 
the first-order condition (7). Hence, there is no underreaction in this setting, since 
log  [ p ( L ) / ( 1 − p ( L ) ) ] − log  ( L ) is constant in L.
We can show that the introduction of prior belief heterogeneity results again in 
price underreaction to information. As before, traders with higher prior beliefs tend 
to take larger positions in asset A, and react relatively more when news favors event 
A. The extra complication is that individual trade heterogeneity depends not only 
on beliefs but just as much on endowments and preferences. Thus, some optimists 
for A actually trade against A in the market because they initially hold even more A 
assets than they would like to keep, and the size of traders’ reaction to news depends 
on preference parameter  α i . Intuitively, however, the underreaction effect appears 
once we average over endowments and preferences. Technically, such averaging is 
feasible since the HARA demand function is multiplicatively separable in beliefs 
and other individual characteristics.
23 See also Musto and Yilmaz (2003) for a model in which traders are subject to wealth risk, because they are 
differentially affected by the redistribution associated with different electoral outcomes.
24 In the special case with β > 0, the absolute risk aversion is decreasing in w, so that these preferences are a 
special case of DARA preferences. CARA results when β = 0.
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PROPOSITION 7: Assume that all traders have HARA preferences with common 
cautiousness parameter β > 0. If prior beliefs are truly heterogeneous and inde-
pendent of other individual characteristics, then the market price underreacts to 
information.
Edgeworth Box Illustration.—The Edgeworth box in Figure 2 graphically illus-
trates our logic for a market with two types of traders (with prior beliefs  q 1 <  q 2 ). 
Traders have convex indifference curves, which are not drawn to avoid cluttering the 
picture. Given that the slope of the indifference curves at any safe allocation is − π i / ( 1 −  π i ) = − q i L/ ( 1 −  q i ) , trader 2 (optimist) has steeper indifference curves than 
trader 1 (pessimist) along the 45-degree line. In equilibrium, the marginal rates of 
substitution are equalized. In the figure, there is aggregate risk as  w 0 ( A ) >  w 0 ( A c ) , 
but in the limit where endowments are homogeneous, the Edgeworth box would be 
a square with the initial endowment,  w i 0 , lying on the common 45-degree line. We 
denote the equilibrium allocation by  w ∗ . In the picture, the less optimistic trader 1 
sells on net asset A, as is always the case with homogeneous endowments.
How is the equilibrium affected by an exogenous change in information from 
L to  L′ > L? Marginal rates of substitution are affected such that all indiffer-
ence curves become steeper by a factor of  L′ /L. For the sake of argument, imag-
ine that the price were to change as a Bayesian update of market belief p ( L ) 
to  p′ = p ( L )  L′ / [  p ( L )  L′ +  ( 1 − p ( L ) ) L ] . Since  p′ > p ( L ) , the new budget line 
through  w i 0 passes above  w ∗ , illustrating the wealth effect which is positive for the 
pessimistic trader 1. Now, as it has been well known since Arrow (1965), DARA 
implies that the wealth expansion paths diverge from the 45-degree line. The richer 
trader 1 thus demands a riskier bundle further away from the 45-degree line than at 
Figure 2
Notes: Edgeworth box representation of the underreaction result. Logarithmic preferences 
result in linear wealth-expansion paths (dotted lines).
Trader 1’s wealth expansion path
Trader 1
Trader 2’s wealth 
expansion path
Trader 2
w2(Ac)
w1(A)
(p′, 1 − p′)
w2(A)
w1(Ac)
wi0
w∗
16 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW jANuARy 2015
w ∗ , whereas the poorer trader 2 demands a safer bundle closer to the 45-degree line. 
To reach a new equilibrium in our picture, the price must adjust so as to eliminate 
the excess demand for asset  A c . This is achieved by a relative reduction in the rela-
tive price for asset A, so that p ( L′ ) <  p′ . Thus prices must underreact to information 
when endowments are homogeneous.
With heterogeneous endowments and preferences outside the HARA class, neither 
under- nor overreaction need result. For instance, an equilibrium may exist where the 
two risk-averse traders hold a bundle on the same side of their respective 45-degree 
line in the Edgeworth box (i.e.,  w 1 ( A ) >  w 1 ( A c ) and  w 2 ( A ) >  w 2 ( A c ) ). The DARA 
wealth expansion paths no longer force the price to underreact in response to infor-
mation, as a rising price of asset 1 consistently takes the net buyer of asset 1 closer 
to the 45-degree line, and the other trader further from the 45-degree line.
III. Dynamic Price Effects
In this section we extend our model to a dynamic setting in which information 
arrives to the market sequentially after the initial round of trade. To set the stage, 
we verify that there exists an equilibrium where the initial round of trade is cap-
tured by our baseline model, and where there is no trade in subsequent periods 
(Proposition 8); this result is consistent with Milgrom and Stokey’s (1982) no 
trade theorem. We then obtain our two substantive results about the price path. 
First, we show that the initial underreaction of the price to information implies 
momentum of the price process in subsequent periods—if the initial price move-
ment is upward, prices subsequently move up on average (Proposition 9, part (i)). 
Under a sufficient symmetry assumption, this implies positive autocorrelation in 
price changes in the short run (Proposition 9, part (ii)). Second, symmetry also 
suffices to obtain a later price reversal after the initial momentum (Proposition 
10). These momentum and reversal effects are aftershocks of the initial under-
reaction, and thus appear in our model even though there is no trading after the 
first period.
A. Model
Consider a constant set of traders I who are initially in the same situation as in 
either of Sections I, IIA, or IIB. In the latter two cases, we assume that all traders’ 
utility functions exhibit strictly DARA. Each trader is allowed to trade at every time 
date t ∈ {1, … , T } at price  p t that is determined competitively. The joint informa-
tion publicly revealed to traders up until period t has likelihood ratio  L t , so that  L t 
encompasses  L t−1 and the new information observed in period t. The asset position 
of trader i after trade at period t is denoted by Δ  x it . At time T + 1 the true event 
is revealed, and the asset pays out. Each trader aims to maximize the subjective 
expected utility of period T + 1 wealth.
A dynamic competitive equilibrium is defined as follows. First, for every 
t = 1, … , T, there is a price function  p t  ( L t ) . By convention,  p T+1 = 1 when A is 
true, and  p T+1 = 0 when  A c is true. Second, given these price functions, every trader 
i chooses a contingent strategy of asset trades in order to maximize expected util-
ity of final wealth. If wealth is constrained as in Section I, the trader’s wealth must 
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always stay nonnegative. Finally, in every period t at any information  L t realization, 
the market clears.
PROPOSITION 8: There exists a dynamic competitive equilibrium with the follow-
ing properties. In the first round of trade, the price  p 1 ( L 1 ) is the static equilibrium 
price p ( L 1 ) from either of Propositions 1, 4, or 7. In all subsequent periods there is 
no trade, and the price satisfies Bayes’ updating rule,
(9)    p t  ( L t )  _ 
1 −  p t  ( L t )  =  
 L t  _  L 1  
 p 1 ( L 1 ) 
  
1 −  p 1 ( L 1 )  .
As in Milgrom and Stokey (1982), when beliefs are concordant there will be no 
trade after the first period. After one round of trade, the marginal rate of substitu-
tion for every trader is equal to the ratio of the competitive prices of the two assets. 
When beliefs are concordant, information changes this marginal rate of substitution 
for every trader in the same way. Thus, the allocation resulting at the end of the first 
period remains an equilibrium allocation, voiding future trade.
In the remainder of this section, we write  p t for the equilibrium price at date t, thus 
suppressing its dependence on  L t .
The marginal trader, who holds posterior belief  π i  ( L 1 ) =  p 1 after the first round 
of trading, remains the marginal trader at future dates. The market price  p t is the 
Bayesian update of this trader’s prior belief  p 1 / [  ( 1 −  p 1 )  L 1 +  p 1 ] with information 
available at time t. From this trader’s point of view prices follow a martingale, i.e., 
E  [  p t 2 |  L  t 1  ] =  p t 1 for all  t 2 >  t 1 ≥ 1.
Every trader who is initially more optimistic than this marginal trader, and hence 
has first-round posterior  π i  ( L 1 ) >  p 1 and has chosen Δ  x i > 0, believes that the price 
process is a sub-martingale (trending upwards). Despite this belief, the no-trade 
theorem establishes that such a trader does not wish to alter the position away from 
the initial Δ  x i . The position already reflects a wealth- or risk-constrained position 
on the asset eventually rising in price, and there is no desire to further speculate on 
the upward trend in future asset prices.
B. Early Momentum
By Propositions 2, 6, and 7, an observer with neutral prior belief q =  p 1 ( 1 ) sees 
initial price underreaction, disagreeing with the marginal trader of posterior belief 
 π i  ( L 1 ) =  p 1 . As more information arrives over time, both the price and the observ-
er’s belief are updated with Bayes’ rule. From the observer’s point of view, how 
are asset prices expected to develop over time? How does the initial disagreement 
change over time?
As a benchmark, recall that the marginal trader believes prices satisfy the mar-
tingale property, E  [  p t 2 −  p t 1 |  L  t 1  ] = 0 for all  t 2 >  t 1 ≥ 0, when we let  p 0 denote this 
trader’s prior belief. The martingale property implies that cov ( p t 3 −  p t 2 ,  p t 2 −  p t 1 |  L  t 1  ) = E [  (  p t 3 −  p t 2 )  (  p t 2 −  p t 1 ) |  L  t 1  ] = 0 for all  t 3 >  t 2 >  t 1 ≥ 0.25
25 Under this belief we have E  [  (  p t 3 −  p t 2 )  ( p t 2 −  p t 1 ) |  L  t 1  ]   =  E  [ E  [  p t 3 −  p t 2 |  L  t 2  ]  (  p t 2 −  p t 1 ) |  L  t 1  ] and 
E [  p t 3 −  p t 2 |  L  t 2  ] = 0 for all  L  t 2  .
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We show that the outside observer with prior q sees a different relation between ini-
tial and future price changes. Following the initial price reaction, prices exhibit early 
momentum, consistent with the empirical findings of Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) 
and subsequent literature. More precisely, the early price change E  [   p t −  p 1 |  L 1 ] 
is no longer zero, but has the same sign as the initial price movement  p 1 − q. 
Intuitively, a fixed prior disagreement matters less for the posterior beliefs, when the 
observer and marginal trader update their beliefs in concordance with subsequent 
information. Since  p t is the marginal trader’s posterior belief, the observer is expect-
ing the asset price  p t to gradually shed its initial underreaction. Underreaction is 
followed by a correcting outward price movement.
We further find that this momentum effect shows up as positive correlation 
between  p t −  p 1 and  p 1 − q if E [  p 1 − q ] = 0.26 The latter unbiased initial disagree-
ment holds under the following first-period symmetry assumption: The distribution 
of priors satisfies G ( 1 − q ) = 1 − G ( q ) for all q ∈  [ 0, 1 ] , and first-period signals 
satisfy that  L 1 has the same distribution as 1/ L 1 .27
PROPOSITION 9: Suppose that beliefs are truly heterogeneous. Fix the observer’s 
prior at the neutral level q =  p 1 ( 1 ) . (i ) Prices exhibit early momentum, i.e., for any 
date t > 1,
(10)  E  [  ( p t −  p 1 )  ( p 1 − q ) |  L 1 ] ≥ 0, 
 with strict inequality when  L 1 ≠ 1 and the distribution of  L t / L 1 is nondegenerate. (ii ) If also first-period symmetry holds, then there is positive autocovariance in 
price changes, i.e., for any date t > 1,
(11)  cov  (  p t −  p 1 ,  p 1 −  p 0 ) ≥ 0, 
 with strict inequality when the distributions of  L 1 and  L t / L 1 are nondegenerate.
Part (ii) predicts that in a regression of subsequent price changes  p t −  p 1 on ini-
tial price reactions  p 1 −  p 0 there should be a positive coefficient.28 In addition, the 
symmetry condition for part (ii) also implies that the observer’s momentum return 
p T+1 −  p 1 is negatively skewed. Under symmetry, initial underreaction means that 
the observer considers the asset price too high if and only if the observer’s posterior 
L 1 / ( 1 +  L 1 ) exceeds  p 0 = 1/2. The conditional expected return  p T+1 −  p 1 follows 
a binomial distribution (since the asset’s payout  p T+1 is either 1 or 0). The binomial 
distribution is negatively skewed precisely when the probability of the high outcome 
26 In price data where events A and  A c are arbitrarily labeled there should be no average direction to the disagree-
ment among observer and marginal trader.
27 Suppose that events A and  A c are equally likely, and let  f 1 ( s 1 | A ) and  f 1 ( s 1 |  A c ) denote conditional densities for 
the publicly observed signal  s 1 . Then  L 1 =  f 1 ( s 1 | A ) / f 1 ( s 1 |  A c ) is a transformation of  s 1 , with conditional distribu-
tions that can be derived from the distributions of  s 1 . If  L 1 is distributed in event A as 1/ L 1 is distributed in event 
 A c , then first-period symmetry is satisfied.
28 Although the present analysis focuses on the periods that follow an initial period in which trade opens, our 
results apply more broadly to trading environments in which the arrival of new information coincides with trade—
either because of added liquidity reasons or differential interpretation of information, from which the present analy-
sis abstracts away.
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exceeds 1/2. Negative skewness in momentum returns is consistent with empirical 
evidence; see Cao, Coval, and Hirshleifer (2002) for a review of the evidence and 
for an alternative explanation based on sidelined investors who delay trading until 
price movements validate their private signals.
Proposition 9 is also consistent with the seemingly conflicting findings on price 
drift recently documented by Gil and Levitt (2007) and Croxson and Reade (2014) 
in the context of sport betting markets. On the one hand, Gil and Levitt (2007) find 
that the immediate price reaction to goals scored in the 2002 World Cup games 
is sizeable but incomplete and that price changes tend to be positively correlated, 
as predicted by our model. On the other hand, Croxson and Reade (2014) find no 
drift during the half-time break, thus challenging the view that the positive correla-
tion of price changes during play time indicates slow incorporation of information. 
Consistent with this second bit of evidence, our model predicts the absence of drift 
when no new information arrives to the market, as it is realistic to assume during the 
break when the game is not played. These results follow when  L t =  L  t ′  =  L  t ″  for all 
periods t in the break { t′ , … , t″ }.
C. Late Reversal
Momentum suggests a tendency for a correction of the initial price underreac-
tion over time. However, there is an additional effect if we extend the symmetry 
assumption to later periods. Later-period symmetry holds when, for every t > 1, 
the distribution of  L t / L 1 conditional on  ( A,  L 1 ) is the same as the distribution of 
 L 1 / L t conditional on  ( A c ,  L 1 ) .29 From the outside observer’s perspective at date 1, 
for every interior date t strictly between the opening date 1 and payout date T + 1, 
the later price change  p T+1 −  p t can be expected to reverse the earlier price change 
p t −  p 1 . The two changes have negative covariance.
PROPOSITION 10: Suppose that prior beliefs are truly heterogeneous, and that 
first-period and later-period symmetry hold. Fix the observer’s prior at q = 1/2. 
Prices exhibit late reversal, i.e., for any date t > 1,
(12)  E  [  ( p T+1 −  p t )  (  p t −  p 1 ) |  L 1 ] ≤ 0
 and
(13)  cov  ( p T+1 −  p t ,  p t −  p 1 ) ≤ 0, 
 with strict inequality provided  L t is not perfectly revealing and the distribution of 
 L t / L 1 is nondegenerate.
29 Continuing from footnote 27, let public signal  s t be observed at time t and added to the history of previously 
observed signals. Suppose that conditional signal distributions are independent, with densities  f t ( s t | A) and  f t  ( s t | A ) . 
If the likelihood ratio  f t  ( s t | A ) / f t  ( s t |  A c ) is distributed in A as  f t  ( s t |  A c ) / f t  ( s t | A ) is distributed in  A c , then 
 L t / L 1 =  ∏  t ′ =2 t   (  f  t ′   ( s  t ′  | A ) / f  t ′   ( s  t ′  |  A c ) ) satisfies the assumptions.
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This reversal effect is consistent with empirical findings in the asset pricing lit-
erature. Thus, in our model reversal is a necessary counterpart to initial momentum. 
Both effects are driven by the same initial disagreement between a market observer 
and the marginal trader.
IV. Conclusion
To recap, our analysis combines three key ingredients—heterogeneous beliefs, 
information, and wealth effects—all hallmarks of financial markets (see Hong and 
Stein 2007). While previous literature has considered the effect of these ingredients 
either in isolation or in partial combination, the simultaneous presence of all three 
ingredients delivers realistic pricing patterns. Information results in a redistribution 
of wealth across traders with different beliefs, so that prices tend to underreact to 
information when traders are subject to wealth effects, either because they have lim-
ited wealth to invest or because their absolute risk aversion decreases with wealth. 
This initial underreaction is followed by momentum in the short run and reversal in 
the long run. Our mechanism provides a single explanation for pricing patterns in 
financial markets that have typically been explained through separate channels.
We see our analysis as a first step toward understanding price reaction to infor-
mation in the presence of heterogeneous beliefs and wealth effects. From a meth-
odological perspective, we contribute a tractable model of asset pricing with two 
events. The model specification with bounded wealth at risk is particularly simple 
and thus could be a useful tool for analyzing asset pricing with wealth effects. The 
specification with risk aversion allows for a characterization of equilibrium asset 
prices with general risk preferences without making additional parametric or distri-
butional assumptions.
The working paper version of this article (Ottaviani and Sørensen 2012) analyzes a 
more general model that encompasses these two specifications by allowing traders to 
have general  risk-averse preferences while at the same time constraining the wealth 
they can invest (for example because of limited borrowing capacity).30 All our results 
continue to hold for this combination, even if all traders have CARA preferences as 
long as our exogenous wealth constraint binds for some traders. Underreaction does 
not result when our wealth-constraint is replaced by a short-selling constraint (as in 
Chen, Hong, and Stein 2002, p. 176); like DARA preferences, wealth constraints 
implicitly bound the position that traders can take on either side of the market.31
While our model is more general in some dimension than the traditional 
 CARA-normal paradigm, the restriction to two events is special. It is natural to won-
der whether underreaction also holds in settings with more than two events. Suppose 
the outcome space is partitioned into K > 2 mutually exclusive evens, and focus 
attention on a change of public information in favor of event k. To fix ideas, consider 
a version of the model with risk-neutral traders and bounded wealth. A trader with 
posterior belief vector π, facing price vector p, invests all money on asset k where 
the ratio  π k / p k is maximal. It is not hard to verify that there is a convex set of prior 
30 Future work could add explicit consideration of borrowing that differentially relaxes the wealth constraints of 
traders; see Fostel and Geanakoplos (2008) for an initial investigation in this direction.
31 See also Baker, Coval, and Stein (2007, p. 270).
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beliefs,   k , for which it is optimal to take position on asset k. Market clearing 
implies that  p k equals the relative wealth endowment held by traders in set   k . The 
information favoring event k implies that  p k rises; hence the wealth endowment 
of the set   k grows. This wider interest is our central underreaction mechanism. 
Our insight that an information change in favor of k must attract traders with prior 
beliefs less favorable to k is thus robust. Complicating the picture, however, the 
equilibrium reduction of wealth allocated to other assets is not necessarily propor-
tional to their prices. In general the set   k may grow in certain directions while 
shrinking in other directions, as the relative prices of other assets change, so the 
overall effect on the price of asset k is unclear in general. Contagion adjusts the 
relative prices of other assets and may feed back to the demand for the focus asset 
in such a way that its price actually overreacts to the information.
The article focuses on the reaction to public information. What if instead 
information is initially privately held by the traders? Ottaviani and Sørensen 
(2012) extend our results to the case where the information is privately held by 
the traders rather than being public. The extension works because in our setting 
all private information held by traders is revealed in a fully revealing rational 
expectations equilibrium (REE). However, there is a tension between the 
assumption of heterogeneous priors and the equilibrium notion. The learning that 
is necessary for strategic (rather than competitive) equilibrium play to become 
sensible could also eliminate heterogeneity in prior beliefs; see Dekel, Fudenberg, 
and Levine (2004).
Our results are particularly striking given our focus on concordant beliefs—even 
though all traders agree on how to interpret information, underreaction results in 
the aggregate through a composition effect. A similar composition effect is at play 
when traders interpret information in a nonconcordant way. The key is that the 
wealth effect moves the marginal trader against the information. In an extension of 
Section I’s static model allowing for nonconcordant beliefs as in Harris and Raviv 
(1993) and Kandel and Pearson (1995), we have verified that underreaction also 
results when some traders assign too great (reflecting overconfidence) or too small 
(underconfidence) a weight on information relative to Bayesian updating, provided 
the distribution of weights in the population is symmetric around Bayesian updat-
ing.32 The occurrence of speculative retrade à la Harrison and Kreps (1978) in 
dynamic extensions poses serious analytical challenges.33 Banerjee and Kremer 
(2010) make progress in a two-period setting. Analyses with nonconcordant beliefs 
along these lines promise to deliver realistic predictions regarding the amount of 
trade.34
32 See also Palfrey and Wang (2012) who modify Harris and Raviv’s (1993) price formation process and obtain 
overreaction to good news and underreaction to bad news. However, they do not address potential momentum or 
reversal.
33 See also Morris (1996) and the survey by Scheinkman and Xiong (2004).
34 See also Beker and Espino (2013) for work in this direction.
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Appendix
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1:
For a given likelihood ratio L, the prior of an individual with posterior belief 
π i is, using (1),  q i =  π i / [  ( 1 −  π i ) L +  π i ] . The  A c asset is demanded in amount 
 w i 0 / ( 1 − p ) by every individual with  π i < p, or equivalently  q i < p/ [  ( 1 − p ) L + p ] . 
The aggregate demand for this asset is then G  ( p/ [  ( 1 − p ) L + p ] ) / ( 1 − p ) . In 
equilibrium, aggregate demand is equal to aggregate supply, equal to 1, resulting in 
equation (2).
Next, we establish that the price defined by (2) is a strictly increasing function 
of L. The left-hand side of (2) is a strictly increasing continuous function of p, 
which is 0 at p = 0 and 1 at p = 1. For any L ∈  ( 0, ∞ ) , the right-hand side is a 
weakly decreasing continuous function of p, for the cumulative distribution func-
tion G is nondecreasing. The right-hand side is equal to 1 at p = 0, while it is 0 
at p = 1. Thus there exists a unique solution, such that G ∉  { 0, 1 } . When L rises, 
the  left-hand side is unaffected, while the right-hand side rises for any p, strictly 
so near the solution to (2) by the assumptions on G. Hence, the solution p must be 
increasing with L. ∎
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2:
(i) When L increases, so does p ( L ) . By equation (2), when p ( L ) increases, 
p ( L ) / [ ( 1 − p ( L ) ) L + p ( L ) ] must fall, because the cumulative distribution 
function G is nondecreasing. (ii) By Proposition 1, p ( L′ ) > p ( L ) . Note that (4) 
is equivalent to
   
p ( L′ ) 
 _ 
1 − p ( L′ )   
1 _  L′  <  
p ( L ) 
 _ 
1 − p ( L )   
1 _ 
L
.
Using the strictly increasing transformation z → z/ ( 1 + z ) on both sides of this 
inequality, it is equivalent to
   
p ( L′ ) 
  __   [ 1 − p ( L′ ) ]  L′ + p ( L′ )  <  
p ( L ) 
  __   [ 1 − p ( L ) ] L + p ( L )  ,
which is true by part (i). ∎
PROOF OF COROLLARY 1:
Combining (4) with (3), we see from (ii) that the function
  Ψ  ( L ) = log  ( π ( L )  _ 1 − π ( L )  ) − log  ( p ( L )  _ 1 − p ( L )  ) 
is strictly increasing in L. Hence, one of the following three cases will hold. In the 
first case, there exists an  L ∗ ∈  ( 0, ∞ ) such that Ψ ( L ) is negative for L <  L ∗ and 
positive for L >  L ∗ —in this case, the result follows with  p ∗ = p ( L ∗ ) . In the second 
case, Ψ ( L ) is negative for all L, and the result holds for  p ∗ = 1. In the third case, 
Ψ ( L ) is positive for all L, and the result is true with  p ∗ = 0. ∎
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PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3:
Note first that p ( ( 1 − m ) /m ) = 1/2 by (2). Consider now L >  ( 1 − m ) /m such 
that the equilibrium prices satisfy π ( L ) > p ( L ) ,  p′ ( L ) > 1/2. If, contrary to the 
claim, p ( L ) <  p′ ( L ) , then (2) implies that
  G  ( p ( L )   __   ( 1 − p ( L ) ) L + p ( L )  ) = 1 − p  ( L ) 
 > 1 −  p′ ( L ) 
 =  G′  (  p′ ( L )   __   ( 1 −  p′ ( L ) ) L +  p′ ( L )  ) .
Further,
   
 p′ ( L ) 
  __   ( 1 −  p′ ( L ) ) L +  p′ ( L )  >  
p ( L ) 
  __   ( 1 − p ( L ) ) L + p ( L )  ,
while  p′ ( L ) > 1/2 in equilibrium implies
   
 p′ ( L ) 
  __   ( 1 −  p′ ( L ) ) L +  p′ ( L )  < m.
Thus the median preserving spread property implies the contradiction,
  G  ( p ( L )   __   ( 1 − p ( L ) ) L + p ( L )  ) <  G′  (  p′ ( L )   __   ( 1 −  p′ ( L ) ) L +  p′ ( L )  ) .
A similar argument applies when L <  ( 1 − m ) /m. ∎
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4:
Let Δ x i denote the choice variable of trader i, such that pΔ x i units of the  A c asset 
are exchanged for  ( 1 − p ) Δ x i units of the A asset. Note that this is a zero net value 
trade, since the asset sale generates  ( 1 − p ) p  | Δ x i | of cash that is spent on buying 
the other asset. The final wealth levels in the two events are:
(A1)   w i  ( A ) =  w i 0 +  ( 1 − p ) Δ x i , 
(A2)   w i  ( A c ) =  w i 0 − pΔ x i .
The individual trader maximizes  π i  u i  ( w i  ( A ) ) +  ( 1 −  π i )  u i  ( w i  ( A c ) ) over Δ x i . The 
first derivative with respect to Δ x i is
   π i  ( 1 − p )  u i ′  ( w i  ( A ) ) −  ( 1 −  π i ) p u i ′  ( w i  ( A c ) ) .
Strict concavity of  u i ensures that the maximand Δ x i is the unique solution to the 
first-order condition (7). By the Theorem of the Maximum, Δ x i is a continuous 
function of  π i and p. We first show that the optimizer Δ x i is strictly decreasing in p 
and strictly increasing in  π i .
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Since  u i ′ > 0, the cross-partial of the objective with respect to the choice variable Δ x i and the exogenous  π i is strictly positive, and hence Δ x i is strictly increasing in  π i . 
A sufficient condition for a strictly negative cross-partial with respect to Δ x i and p is
(A3)  Δ x i  [  π i  ( 1 − p )  u i ′′  ( w i  ( A ) ) −  ( 1 −  π i ) p u i ′′  ( w i  ( A c ) ) ] > 0.
Using the first-order condition for interior optimality, the second factor of (A3) is 
positive if and only if
  −   u i ′′  ( w i  ( A 
c ) ) 
 _ u i ′  ( w i  ( A c ) )   > −  
 u i ′′  ( w i  ( A ) ) 
 _ u i ′  ( w i  ( A ) )   .
By the DARA assumption, this inequality holds if and only if  w i  ( A ) >  w i  ( A c ) , i.e., Δ x i > 0. Thus the cross-partial is strictly negative for all Δ x i ≠ 0, so that Δ x i is 
strictly decreasing in p.
Equilibrium is characterized by the requirement that the aggregate purchase of 
asset A must be zero, i.e.,  ∫ 0 1 Δ x i  ( p,  q i , L ) dG = 0. When p = 0, every trader has π i > p and hence Δ x i > 0, while the opposite relation holds when p = 1. Individual 
demands are continuous and strictly decreasing in p, so there exists a unique equi-
librium price in  ( 0, 1 ) . When L is increased,  π i  ( L ) rises, and hence Δ x i rises for 
every trader. In order to restore equilibrium, the price must then strictly increase. ∎
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 5:
The necessary and sufficient first-order condition (7) for the individual optimum 
is solved by
(A4)  Δ  x i =  t i log  ( 1 − p ( L )  _p ( L )     π i  ( L )  _ 1 −  π i  ( L )  ) .
Market clearing occurs when  ∫ 0 1 Δ x i dG = 0. By (A4) and using  π i  ( L ) / ( 1 −  π i ( L ) ) =  q i L/ ( 1 −  q i ) , this is solved by p ( L ) = qL/ ( qL + 1 − q ) . ∎
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 6:
The result follows as in the proof of Proposition 2, once we establish that 
log [ p ( L ) / ( 1 − p ( L ) ) ] − log ( L ) is strictly decreasing in L. Suppose, for a 
contradiction, that log  [ p ( L ) / ( 1 − p ( L ) ) ] − log  ( L ) is nondecreasing near 
some L. We will argue in the next paragraph that individual demand satis-
fies dΔ x i /dL < 0. Since market clearing  ∫ 0 1 Δ x i  ( p ( L ) ,  q i , L ) dG = 0 implies 
 ∫ 0 1  [ dΔ x i  ( p,  q i , L ) /dL ] dG = 0, we will then obtain a contradiction establishing 
the claim.
Since log  [ π i (L)/ ( 1 −  π i ( L ) ) ] − log  ( L ) is constant, (7) implies that 
 u i ′  ( w i  ( A ) ) / u i ′  ( w i  ( A c ) ) is nondecreasing in L. Using the expressions for 
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the final wealth levels (A1) and (A2), nonnegativity of the derivative of 
 u i ′  ( w i  ( A ) ) / u i ′  ( w i  ( A c ) ) implies that
   u i ′′  ( w i  ( A ) )  u i ′  ( w i  ( A c ) )  [ ( 1 − p )  dΔ x i  _dL  − Δ x i  dp _dL  ] 
    ≥ −  u i ′′  ( w i  ( A c ) )  u i ′  ( w i  ( A ) )  [ p  dΔ x i  _dL  + Δ x i  dp _dL  ] .
The second derivative of the utility function is negative, so this implies
(A5)  dΔ x i  _
dL
  ≤ Δ x i  dp _dL   
 u i ′′  ( w i  ( A ) )  u i ′  ( w i  ( A c ) ) −  u i ′′  ( w i  ( A c ) )  u i ′  ( w i  ( A ) ) 
    ___     ( 1 − p )  u i ′′  ( w i  ( A ) )  u i ′  ( w i  ( A c ) ) + p u i ′′  ( w i  ( A c ) )  u i ′  ( w i  ( A ) )  .
On the right-hand side of (A5), dp/dL > 0 by Proposition 4, and the denomina-
tor is negative. Recall that Δ  x i > 0 if and only if  w i  ( A ) >  w i  ( A c ) . By DARA, this 
implies that
  −   u i ′′  ( w i  ( A ) )  _ u i ′  ( w i  ( A ) )   < −  
 u i ′′  ( w i  ( A c ) ) 
 _ u i ′  ( w i  ( A c ) )   
or that the numerator is positive. Likewise, when Δ x i < 0, the numerator is negative. 
In either case, the right-hand side of (A5) is strictly negative. Hence, dΔ  x i /dL < 0 
for every trader. ∎
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 7:
The proof proceeds in five steps, first deriving individual demand functions, 
deriving an equation to characterize equilibrium, establishing two helpful technical 
results, proving existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium, and finally proving 
underreaction. 
Step 1: We first consider the individual asset demand problem of trader i, given 
market price p and information realization L. It follows from integration of the 
HARA property that
   
 u i ′  ( w i  ( A ) ) 
 _ u i ′  ( w i  ( A C ) )   =  (  α i + β  w i  ( A C )   __ α i + β  w i  ( A )   ) 1/β .
The necessary first-order condition (7) then reduces to
(A6)   q i β  L β  ( 1 − p ) β  ( α i + β  w i  ( A C ) ) =  ( 1 −  q i ) β  p β  ( α i + β  w i  ( A ) ) .
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The budget constraint is
  p w i  ( A ) +  ( 1 − p )  w i  ( A c ) = p w i 0  ( A ) +  ( 1 − p )  w i 0  ( A c ) .
Solving these two linear equations for the pair  ( w i  ( A ) ,  w i  ( A c ) ) , we find
 w i  ( A ) =   ( 1 − p ) 
β  q i β L β β  [ p w i 0  ( A ) +  ( 1 − p )  w i 0  ( A c ) ] −  ( 1 − p )  [  p β ( 1 −  q i ) β −  ( 1 − p ) β  q i β  L β ]  α i 
      _____
p  ( 1 − p ) β  q i β  L β β +  ( 1 − p )  p β  ( 1 −  q i ) β β ,
 w i  ( A c ) =   p 
β  ( 1 −  q i ) β β  [ p w i 0  ( A ) +  ( 1 − p )  w i 0  ( A c ) ] + p [   p β  ( 1 −  q i ) β −  ( 1 − p ) β  q i β  L β ]  α i 
      _____
p  ( 1 − p ) β  q i β  L β β +  ( 1 − p )  p β  ( 1 −  q i ) β β  .
It follows that asset demand is multiplicatively separable,
 α i + β w i  ( A ) 
  =  [ α i + β  [ p w i 0  ( A ) +  ( 1 − p )  w i 0  ( A c ) ] ]   ( 1 − p ) 
β  q i β L β    ___   
p  ( 1 − p ) β  q i β  L β +  ( 1 − p )  p β ( 1 −  q i ) β  ,
 α i + β  w i  ( A c ) 
  =  [ α i + β  [ p w i 0  ( A ) +  ( 1 − p )  w i 0  ( A c ) ] ]   p 
β ( 1 −  q i ) β ___    
p  ( 1 − p ) β  q i β  L β +  ( 1 − p )  p β  ( 1 −  q i ) β  .
Step 2: We next turn to the aggregate property of the equilibrium. Averaging 
across the four individual characteristics, keeping in mind that the markets must 
clear, and employing the assumption that  q i is independent of the other individual 
characteristics,
 α + β  w 0  ( A ) =  [ α + β  [ p  w 0  ( A ) +  ( 1 − p )  w 0  ( A c ) ] ] 
 × E  [   ( 1 − p ) β  q i β  L β    ___   p  ( 1 − p ) β  q i β  L β +  ( 1 − p )  p β  ( 1 −  q i ) β  ] ,
α + β  w 0  ( A c ) =  [ α + β  [ p  w 0   ( A ) +  ( 1 − p )  w 0  ( A c ) ] ] 
 × E  [   p β  ( 1 −  q i ) β    ___   p  ( 1 − p ) β  q i β  L β +  ( 1 − p )  p β  ( 1 −  q i ) β  ] .
The expectations operator here denotes averaging over the distribution of the prior  q i . 
Thus, there exists a positive constant K =  [ α + β  w 0  ( A ) ] / [ α + β  w 0  ( A c ) ] such that, 
for every information realization L, the equilibrium price p ( L ) satisfies
  E  [   ( 1 − p  ( L ) ) β  q i β  L β     ____     p  ( L )  ( 1 − p  ( L ) ) β  q i β  L β +  ( 1 − p  ( L ) ) p  ( L ) β  ( 1 −  q i ) β  ] 
    = KE  [  p  ( L ) β  ( 1 −  q i ) β    ____   p  ( L ) ( 1 − p  ( L ) ) β  q i β  L β +  ( 1 − p  ( L ) ) p  ( L ) β  ( 1 −  q i ) β  ] ,
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i.e.,
(A7)  0 = E  [   ( 1 − p  ( L )  _p  ( L )   L ) β − K  ( 1 −  q i  _ q i   ) β     __     ( 1 − p  ( L )  _p  ( L )   L ) β +  1 − p  ( L )  _p  ( L )   K  ( 1 −  q i  _ q i   ) β  ] , 
where we removed a nonzero factor p  ( L ) before arriving at the last line. This equa-
tion characterizes the equilibrium price p  ( L ) ∈  ( 0, 1 ) .
Step 3: We derive two convenient results. (i) If a, b, c, d, x are positive 
reals, then  ( ax − b ) / ( d + cx ) ≤  ( ax − b ) / ( d + bc/a ) . To prove this, note that 
both denominators are positive. The desired inequality is then equivalent to 
 ( ax − b )  ( d + bc/a )   ≤   ( ax − b )  ( d + cx ) , i.e.,  ( ax − b ) bc/a  ≤   ( ax − b ) cx, 
equivalent to the true 0 ≤ ac ( x − b/a ) 2 . (ii) Suppose that Y is a nondegenerate 
random variable, f is a positive, strictly increasing function, and g is a strictly 
increasing function, such that E [  f  ( Y ) ] , E [ g ( Y ) ] , and E [  f  ( Y ) g ( Y ) ] are well-
defined finite numbers. Then E [  f  ( Y ) g ( Y ) ] > E [  f  ( Y ) ] E [ g ( Y ) ] . To see this, let 
P denote the probability distribution for Y, and define the probability distribution 
P′ by d P′ /dP = f/E [  f  ( Y ) ] . Since the likelihood ratio f/E [  f  ( Y ) ] is strictly increas-
ing,  P′ first-order stochastically dominates P. Since g is increasing, it follows that
  E  [  f  ( Y ) g  ( Y ) ] =  ∫   fgdP = E   [  f  ( Y ) ]   ∫   gd  P′ 
 > E  [  f  ( Y ) ]   ∫   gdP = E  [  f  ( Y ) ] E  [ g ( Y ) ] .
Step 4: We verify that there exists a uniquely defined strictly increasing equilib-
rium price function p ( L ) solving (A7). Write x =  ( 1 − p ) /p. We aim to show that x 
is a decreasing function of L when
(A8)  0 = E  [   ( xL ) β − K  ( 1 −  q i  _ q i   ) β   _ ( xL ) β + xK  ( 1 −  q i  _ q i   ) β   ] .
First, note that the expectation is a continuous function of x > 0. From Step 3 
part (i), we have
   E  [   ( xL ) β − K  ( 1 −  q i  _ q i   ) β   _ ( xL ) β + xK  ( 1 −  q i  _ q i   ) β   ] ≤ E  [   ( xL ) β − K  ( 1 −  q i  _ q i   ) β   _  ( xL ) β + x  ( xL ) β   ] 
     =  
 ( xL ) β − KE  [  ( 1 −  q i  _ q i   ) β ]    _ ( xL ) β + x  ( xL ) β   .
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The latter expression is negative when x is sufficiently close to zero, so the  right-hand 
side of (A8) is negative in that region. Likewise,
    E  [   ( xL ) β − K  ( 1 −  q i  _ q i   ) β   _ ( xL ) β + xK  ( 1 −  q i  _ q i   ) β   ] = E  [   ( xL ) β  (  q i  _ 1 −  q i  ) β − K  _ ( xL ) β  (  q i  _ 1 −  q i  ) β + xK  ] 
      ≥  
 ( xL ) β E  [  (  q i  _ 1 −  q i  ) β ] − K
  _  
K + xK  
which is positive once x is sufficiently large. Hence, a solution exists. We now show 
that every solution to (A8) is an up-crossing, which proves uniqueness, and helps 
toward proving monotonicity. The partial derivative with respect to x is
  E  [  β  x  β  L β K  ( 1 −  q i  _ q i   ) β + β  x  β−1  L β K  ( 1 −  q i  _ q i   ) β −  ( xL ) β K  ( 1 −  q i  _ q i   ) β +  K  2  ( 1 −  q i  _ q i   ) 2β        _ __    [ ( xL ) β + xK  ( 1 −  q i  _ q i   ) β ] 2   ] 
    = E  [  β  x  β  L β K  ( 1 −  q i  _ q i   ) β + β  x β−1  L β K  ( 1 −  q i  _ q i   ) β     _ _ [ ( xL ) β + xK  ( 1 −  q i  _ q i   ) β ] 2   ] 
    − E  [   ( xL ) β − K  ( 1 −  q i  _ q i   ) β   _   [ ( xL ) β + xK  ( 1 −  q i  _ q i   ) β ]   K  ( 1 −  q i  _ q i   ) β   _   [ ( xL ) β + xK  ( 1 −  q i  _ q i   ) β ]  ] .
Here, the second expectation is negative at any crossing by Step 3, part (ii) with 
f  ( y )   =  K y  β / ( ( xL ) β + xK y  β ) and g ( y )   =   ( K y  β −  ( xL ) β ) / ( ( xL ) β + xK y  β ) where 
E [ g ( Y ) ] = 0 by (A8). The first expectation is positive, so the partial derivative with 
respect to x is positive. Finally, we note that the expectation in (A8) is increasing in 
L since the partial derivative is
  E  [  β  x  β+1  L β−1 K  ( 1 −  q i  _ q i   ) β + β  x  β  L β−1 K  ( 1 −  q i  _ q i   ) β      _ _ [ ( xL ) β + xK  ( 1 −  q i  _ q i   ) β ] 2   ] .
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Step 5: For our main comparative statics result, define z =  ( 1 − p ( L ) ) L/p ( L ) . 
To show underreaction, we aim to establish that z is an increasing function of L, or 
equivalently that z is a decreasing function of x =  ( 1 − p ( L ) ) /p ( L ) . The equilib-
rium relationship in (A7) can be rewritten as
(A9)  0 = E  [   z  β − K  ( 1 −  q i  _ q i   ) β   _ z  β + xK  ( 1 −  q i  _ q i   ) β   ] .
The partial derivative with respect to z is
  E  [  β  z  β−1 xK  ( 1 −  q i  _ q i   ) β + β  z  β−1 K  ( 1 −  q i  _ q i   ) β     _ _ [ z  β + xK  ( 1 −  q i  _ q i   ) β ] 2   ] > 0.
The partial derivative with respect to x is
  − E  [   z  β − K  ( 1 −  q i  _ q i   ) β   _   [ z  β + xK  ( 1 −  q i  _ q i   ) β ]   K  ( 1 −  q i  _ q i   ) β   _    [ z  β + xK  ( 1 −  q i  _ q i   ) β ]  ] > 0,
where the sign follows from Step 3, part (ii), using f  ( y ) = K  y  β / ( z  β + xK  y  β ) and 
g ( y ) =  ( K  y  β −  z  β ) / ( z  β + xK  y  β ) with E [ g ( Y ) ] = 0 by (A9). ∎
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 8:
See the online Appendix for this proof.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 9:
(i) The price at t satisfies Bayes’ rule,
    p t  ( L t ) =   p 1  ( L 1 )  L t   __  p 1  ( L 1 )  L t +  ( 1 −  p 1  ( L 1 ) )  L 1  
     =  p 1  ( L 1 ) +   ( 1 −  p 1  ( L 1 ) )  p 1  ( L 1 )  ( L t −  L 1 )    ___ p 1  ( L 1 )  L t +  ( 1 −  p 1  ( L 1 ) )  L 1   .
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The observer’s posterior at time 1 is π ( L 1 ) = q L 1 / ( q L 1 + 1 − q ) . For the observer,
 E  [ p t  ( L t ) −  p 1  ( L 1 ) |  L 1 ] 
  = π  ( L 1 ) E  [ p t  ( L t ) −  p 1  ( L 1 ) | A,  L 1 ] +  ( 1 − π  ( L 1 ) ) E  [ p t  ( L t ) −  p 1 ( L 1 ) |  A c ,  L 1 ] 
  =  ( π  ( L 1 ) −  p 1  ( L 1 ) )  { E  [ p t  ( L t ) −  p 1  ( L 1 ) | A,  L 1 ] − E  [ p t  ( L t ) −  p 1  ( L 1 ) |  A c ,  L 1 ] } ,
using the martingale property of Bayes updated prices.
At time 1, there is uncertainty about the realization of the future  L t . Bayes’ rule 
implies  L t / L 1 = f  ( L t | A,  L 1 ) /f  ( L t |  A c ,  L 1 ) , where f denotes the p.d.f. for  L t . For any 
realization of  L 1 , we write  p 1 for the known  p 1 ( L 1 ) . Then
  E  [  (  p t  ( L t ) −  p 1  ( L 1 ) ) (  p 1  ( L 1 ) − q ) |  L 1 ] 
    =  (  p 1 − q ) ( π  ( L 1 ) −  p 1 )  ∫ 0 ∞  (  p t ( L t ) −  p 1 ) ( L t −  L 1 ) f  ( L t |  A c ,  L 1 ) d L t 
    =  (  p 1 −  p 1 ( 1 ) ) ( π  ( L 1 ) −  p 1 )  ∫ 0 ∞   ( 1 −  p 1 )  p 1  ( L t −  L 1 ) 2   __ p 1  L t +  ( 1 −  p 1 )  L 1    f  ( L t | A,  L 1 ) d L t .
All terms inside the integral are positive, and the entire integral is positive when 
L t / L 1 has a nondegenerate distribution. By underreaction,  ( p 1 ( L 1 ) −  p 1 ( 1 ) ) 
×   ( π  ( L 1 ) −  p 1  ( L 1 ) )   >  0 for all  L 1   ≠  1. Hence, E  [  ( p t  ( L t ) −  p 1  ( L 1 ) ) 
×  ( p 1  ( L 1 ) − q ) |  L 1 ] > 0 for all  L 1 ≠ 1.
(ii) By equation (2), symmetry of G implies that  p 1 ( L 1 ) = 1 −  p 1 ( 1/ L 1 ) . In par-
ticular, our observer has a fair prior, q =  p 1 ( 1 ) = 1/2. The assumption on the dis-
tribution of  L 1 implies that  p 1 has the same distribution as 1 −  p 1 , so E [  p 1 ] = 1/2. 
Thus, E [  p 1 − q ] = 0. Averaging (10) over  L 1 , E [  ( p t −  p 1 )  ( p 1 − q ) ] > 0. Now, 
cov (  p t −  p 1 ,  p 1 − q ) = E [  (  p t −  p 1 )  (  p 1 − q ) ] − E [  p t −  p 1 ] E [  p 1 − q ] = E [  ( p t −  p 1 )  ( p 1 − q ) ] > 0. ∎
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 10:
Symmetry implies that the distribution of  L t / ( L t +  L 1 ) conditional on  ( A,  L 1 ) 
is identical to the distribution of  L 1 / ( L 1 +  L t ) conditional on  ( A c ,  L 1 ) . It fol-
lows that f  ( L 1 2/ L t | A,  L 1 )   =   ( L t / L 1 ) 2  f  ( L t |  A c ,  L 1 )   =   ( L t / L 1 )  f  ( L t | A,  L 1 ) , when 
again f denotes the p.d.f. for  L t .35 Recall from the text that the expectation of 
35 Event invariance implies that Pr  ( L 1 2/L ≤  L t | A,  L 1 )   =  Pr  ( L 1 / ( L 1 + L ) ≤  L t / ( L t +  L 1 ) | A,  L 1 ) 
= Pr  ( L 1 / ( L 1 + L ) ≤  L 1 / ( L 1 +  L t ) |  A c ,  L 1 ) = Pr  ( L t ≤ L |  A c ,  L 1 ) . The expression for the conditional densities 
follows from differentiation with respect to L on both sides.
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 ( p T+1 −  p t ( L t ) )  ( p t ( L t ) −  p 1 ( L 1 ) ) is zero under the marginal trader’s belief implied 
by  L 1 . For the observer, recalling expressions from the proof of Proposition 9, then
  E  [  ( p T+1 −  p t  ( L t ) ) ( p t  ( L t ) −  p 1  ( L 1 ) ) |  L 1 ] 
    = π  ( L 1 )  ∫ 0 ∞  ( 1 −  p t  ( L t ) ) ( p t  ( L t ) −  p 1  ( L 1 ) )  f  ( L t | A,  L 1 ) d L t 
 −  ( 1 − π  ( L 1 ) )  ∫ 0 ∞  p t  ( L t ) ( p t  ( L t ) −  p 1  ( L 1 ) )  f  ( L t |  A c ,  L 1 ) d L t 
    =  ( π  ( L 1 ) −  p 1  ( L 1 ) )  ∫ 0 ∞  ( 1 −  p t  ( L t ) ) ( p t  ( L t ) −  p 1  ( L 1 ) )  f  ( L t | A,  L 1 ) d L t 
 +  ( π  ( L 1 ) −  p 1 (  L 1 ) )  ∫ 0 ∞  p t  ( L t ) ( p t  ( L t ) −  p 1  ( L 1 ) )  f  ( L t |  A c ,  L 1 ) d L t 
    =  ( π  ( L 1 ) −  p 1 (  L 1 ) )  ∫ 0 ∞   p t  ( L t )  _ p 1  ( L 1 )    ( p t  ( L t ) −  p 1  ( L 1 ) )  f  ( L t |  A c ,  L 1 ) d L t ,
where we employed Bayes’ rule
   
 p t  ( L t ) 
 _ 
1 −  p t  ( L t )  =  
 p 1  ( L 1 ) 
 _ 
1 −  p 1  ( L 1 )   
 L t  _  L 1 =  
 p 1  ( L 1 ) 
 _ 
1 −  p 1  ( L 1 )   
f   ( L t | A,  L 1 ) 
 _ 
f   ( L t |  A c ,  L 1 )   .
Recalling the expressions for  p t ( L t ) and  p t ( L t ) −  p 1 ( L 1 ) ,
   ∫ 
0
 ∞   p t  ( L t )  _ p 1    ( p t  ( L t ) −  p 1 )  f  ( L t |  A c ,  L 1 ) d L t 
    =  ∫ 
0
 ∞   L 1  ( 1 −  p 1 )  p 1  ( L t −  L 1 )   __ [ p 1  L t +  ( 1 −  p 1 )  L 1 ] 2    f  ( L t | A,  L 1 ) d L t .
We will employ the symmetry property to prove that this integral has the same sign 
as 1 − 2 p 1 ( L 1 ) . Thus, over the range from 0 to  L 1 , change variables to L =  L 1 2/ L t . 
The integral over this range becomes
   ∫  L 1  ∞   L 1  ( 1 −  p 1 )  p 1  ( ( L 1 
2/ L t ) −  L 1 ) 
   ___ [ p 1  ( L 1 2/ L t ) +  ( 1 −  p 1 )  L 1 ] 2    f  ( ( L 1 
2/ L t ) | A,  L 1 )  (  L 1  _L  ) 2 dL
    =  ∫  L 1  ∞   L 1  ( 1 −  p 1 )  p 1  ( L 1 − L )   __ [ p 1  L 1 +  ( 1 −  p 1 ) L ] 2    f  ( L | A,  L 1 ) dL.
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Thus,
   ∫ 
0
 ∞   L 1  ( 1 −  p 1 )  p 1  ( L t −  L 1 )   __ [ p 1  L t +  ( 1 −  p 1 )  L 1 ] 2    f  ( L t | A,  L 1 ) d L t 
    =  L 1  ( 1 −  p 1 )  p 1 
   ∫  L 1  ∞  (  L t −  L 1  __  [ p 1  L t +  ( 1 −  p 1 )  L 1 ] 2  −   L t −  L 1  __  [ p 1  L 1 +  ( 1 −  p 1 )  L t ] 2  ) f  ( L t | A,  L 1 ) d L t .
Observe that
   1 __  [ p 1  L t +  ( 1 −  p 1 )  L 1 ] 2  >  
1 __  [ p 1  L 1 +  ( 1 −  p 1 )  L t ] 2  
if and only if  ( 2 p 1 − 1 )  ( L t −  L 1 ) < 0. This holds over the entire range where 
L t >  L 1 if and only if  p 1 < 1/2. Hence, the entire integral has the same sign as 1 − 
2 p 1 ( L 1 ) , as desired. Its product with π  ( L 1 ) −  p 1 ( L 1 ) is negative for all  L 1 ≠ 1: 
when  L 1 < 1 we have π  ( L 1 ) <  p 1 ( L 1 ) < 1/2, while when  L 1 > 1 we have π  ( L 1 ) > 
 p 1 ( L 1 ) > 1/2. The desired inequality (12) follows. Finally, averaging (12) 
over  L 1 and using the symmetry property E [  p t ] = E [  p 1 ] = 1/2, it follows that 
cov ( p T+1 −  p t ,  p t −  p 1 ) = E [  ( p T+1 −  p t )  ( p t −  p 1 ) ] − E [  p T+1 −  p t ] E [  p t −  p 1 ] < 0. ∎
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